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Editors Ian Beckett and John Pimlott brought together a team of expert contributors who provided an international overview of counter-insurgency strategies and techniques as they were perceived and put into practice a generation ago.This historical survey, which covers irregular warfare in countries as widely separated as Chad, Vietnam, Uruguay and Mozambique, will be fascinating reading for anyone studying insurgencies and the armed response to them.

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Counter-Insurgency: Lessons from History. Ian F.W. Beckett, John Pimlott. Insurgencies are at the center of most of the conflicts that confront the modern world, and they have been since the Second World War. Leading armies across the globe have well-developed strategies for fighting counter-insurgency campaigns which are continually adjusted and refined as a result of direct experience gained in the field.

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Counter-insurgency Lessons from History By Ian F W Beckett & John Pimlott Pen and Sword (www.pen-and-sword.co.uk) RRP GBP £12.99 ISBN 9781848843967 USE THE CODE "25PERCMILITARY" and RECEIVE 25% of the RRP WHEN ORDERING FROM THE PUBLISHER In the current environment counter-insurgency operations have assumed the most dominant role of modern warfare.

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Counter Insurgency Lessons From History

At base, studying effective counterrevolution offered US leaders lessons in repurposing Britain’s history of “imperial policing” throughout the world. These lessons—their fundamental imperial logic—quickly undergirded America’s network of client states, which received US counterinsurgency training programs during the Cold War.

The “Lessons” of Britain’s Counterinsurgency in Malaya . . .

Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902. TIMOTHY K. DEADY. “It should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines..andbyproving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.”.

Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The . . .

Publication of the Army’s history of the war on terror – indefinitely postponed. The U.S. Army is withdrawing from its longest wars and pivoting towards conflict against state opponents. Though some are calling to abandon all things counter-insurgency, the Army must preserve hard-won lessons from fighting against non-state opponents. With more leaders lacking combat experience, the military risks losing these lessons from its long wars.

Lessons From the Long War: The Role of Information in . . .

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Canadian Military History Volume 16|Issue 4 Article 8 4-26-2012 Fighting the Mujahideen: Lessons from the Soviet Counter-Insurgency Experience if Afghanistan Tony Balasevicius Royal Military College of Canada Greg Smith Canadian Armed Forces This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier.

Fighting the Mujahideen: Lessons from the Soviet Counter . . .

As a result, many of the lessons that could have been drawn from the campaign had to be relearned later, initially by Belgian forces fighting their own war against Arab slavers in the Congo in the 1890s, and later by French officers like Colonels Roger Trinquier and David Galula, who developed modern counter-insurgency strategies during the bitter Indo-Chinese and Algerian insurgencies.

MILITARY HISTORY ONLINE

In Counter-insurgency in Nigeria, Omeni, a Nigerian academic, discusses the interactions between certain features away from the battlefield, which account for battlefield performance against insurgent warfare. Specifically, Omeni argues that the trio of historical experience, organisational culture (OC) and doctrine, help explain the institution of COIN within militaries and their tendency to reject the innovation and adaptation often necessary to defeat insurgency.

Counter-Insurgency – Wikipedia

ISBN: 1848843968 9781848843967: OCLC Number: 752679664: Notes: Previous edition: Armed forces and modern counter-insurgency. 1985. Description: xi, 232 pages : maps . . .

Counter-insurgency : lessons from history (Book, 2011 . . .

By Lt Col John Nagl After learning painful lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has become the most capable counterinsurgency force in history., After learning painful lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has become the most capable counterinsurgency force in history. By Lt. Col. (retd.) John Nagl, author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and . . .

Insurgencies are at the centre of most of the conflicts that confront the modern world, and they have been since the Second World War. Leading armies across the globe have well-developed strategies for fighting counterinsurgency campaigns which are continually adjusted and refined as a result of direct experience gained in the field. Understanding this experience and learning the right lessons from it are essential as new insurgencies break out. Perhaps this is especially important today in the wake of the attacks on America and the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that is why this new edition of a pioneering survey of the subject, first published 25 years ago, is of such immediate relevance today. Editors Ian Beckett and John Pimlott brought together a team of expert contributors who provided an international overview of counter-insurgency strategies and techniques as they were perceived and put into practice a generation ago.This historical survey, which covers irregular warfare in countries as widely separated as Chad, Vietnam, Uruguay and Mozambique, will be fascinating reading for anyone studying insurgencies and the armed response to them.

This timely book offers a world history of insurgencies and of counterinsurgency warfare. Jeremy Black moves beyond the conventional Western-centric narrative, reaching back to antiquity to trace the pre-modern origins of war within states. His sweeping study will be essential reading for all students of military history.

Examines the differences in the abilities of the British Army in Malaya and the United States Army in Vietnam to adapt their strategies when confronted with unexpected guerilla warfare.

Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.

This two-volume history of counterinsurgency covers all the major and many of the lesser known examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict, addressing the various measures employed in the attempt to overcome the insurgency and examining the individuals and organizations responsible for everything from counterterrorism to infrastructure building. • Provides an extremely broad coverage of counterinsurgency that spans the period from 1900 to the present day and addresses geographical areas such as Algeria, India, Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan, Malaya, Cyprus, Vietnam, and many other regions and countries • Supplies historical and geographical perspectives that enable the reader to examine each chapter as an independent case study and compare and contrast each event with others to draw lessons across time • Includes an extensive bibliography that covers all aspects of modern counterinsurgency-based themes, including geographical regions, theory, and tactics

David Kilcullen is one of the world’s most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare, a ground-breaking theorist whose ideas “are revolutionizing military thinking throughout the west” (Washington Post). Indeed, his vision of modern warfare powerfully influenced the United States’ decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq and implement “the Surge,” now recognized as a dramatic success. In Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen brings together his most salient writings on this vitally important topic. Here is a picture of modern warfare by someone who has had his boots on the ground in some of today’s worst trouble spots—including Iraq and Afghanistan—and who has been studying counterinsurgency since 1985. Filled with down-to-earth, common-sense insights, this book is the definitive account of counterinsurgency, indispensible for all those interested in making sense of our world in an age of terror.

Learning to Forget analyzes the evolution of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine over the last five decades. Beginning with an extensive section on the lessons of Vietnam, it traces the decline of COIN in the 1970s, then the rebirth of low intensity conflict through the Reagan years, in the conflict in Bosnia, and finally in the campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately it closes the loop by explaining how, by confronting the lessons of Vietnam, the US Army found a way out of those most recent wars. In the process it provides an illustration of how military leaders make use of history and demonstrates the difficulties of drawing lessons from the past that can usefully be applied to contemporary circumstances. The book outlines how the construction of lessons is tied to the construction of historical memory and demonstrates how histories are constructed to serve the needs of the present. In so doing, it creates a new theory of doctrinal development.

In Resisting Rebellion, Anthony James Joes explores insurgencies ranging across five continents and spanning more than two centuries. Analyzing examples from North and South America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, he identifies recurrent patterns and offers useful lessons for future policymakers. Insurgencies arise from many sources of discontent, including foreign occupation, fraudulent elections, and religious persecution, but they also stem from ethnic hostilities, the aspirations of would-be elites, and traditions of political violence. Because insurgency is as much a political phenomenon as a military one, effective counterinsurgency requires a thorough understanding of the insurgents’ motives and sources of support. Clear political aims must guide military action if a counterinsurgency is to be successful and prepare a lasting reconciliation within a deeply fragmented society. The most successful counterinsurgency campaign undertaken by the United States was the one against Philippine insurgents following the Spanish-American War. But even more instructive than successful counterinsurgencies are the persistent patterns of errors revealed by Joes’s comparative study. Instances include the indiscriminate destructiveness displayed by the Japanese in China and the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the torture of suspected Muslim terrorists by members of the French Army in Algeria. Joes’s comprehensive twofold approach to counterinsurgency is easily applied to the U.S. The first element, developing the strategic basis for victory, emphasizes creating a peaceful path to the redress of legitimate grievances, committing sufficient troops to the counterinsurgent operation, and isolating the conflict area from outside aid. The second element aims at marginalizing the insurgents and includes fair conduct toward civilians and prisoners, systematic intelligence gathering, depriving insurgents of weapons and food, separating insurgent leaders from their followers, and offering amnesty to all but the most incorrigible. Providing valuable insights into a world of conflict, Resisting Rebellion is a thorough and readable exploration of successes and failures in counterinsurgency’s long history and a strategy for the future.

In Crossroads of Intervention, Todd Greentree argues that there are many valuable lessons to be learned about the nature of irregular warfare from the experiences of the United States in Central America during the final decade of the Cold War. This first comprehensive Strategy and policy analysis of U.S. intervention in Central America examines the origins, dynamics, and termination of the Sandinista insurrection in Nicaragua, the Salvadoran government’s decade-long Counterinsurgency against the FMLN, and the Contra insurgency against the Sandinistas. Greentree establishes the historical, political, and conceptual relationship between U.S. involvement in the Central American, wars, the Vietnam War and the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, while laying the foundation for an expanded understanding of the fundamental and recurring nature of insurgency, and intervention. U.S. involvement in Central America during the 1280s clearly demonstrates the costs, risks, and limits of intervention and the use of force in internal conflicts. The consequences of such involvement, he warns, must not be forgotten. Hispanic Heritage Month Reading List.

A searing indictment of US strategy in Afghanistan from a distinguished military leader and West Point military historian—“A remarkable book” (National Review). In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States’ limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda. Drawing both on the author’s experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile’s views of the failures of COIN, as well as a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan. “Gentile is convinced that Obama’s ‘surge’ in Afghanistan can’t work. . . . And, if Afghanistan doesn’t turn around soon, the Democrats . . . who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare . . . may find themselves wondering whether it’s time to go back to the drawing board.” —The New Republic

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